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CONSTITUTION AND COURT AS SYMBOLS
MAX LERNERt
We live by symbols.
-MR. JUSTICE HOLMES'
I. SYMBOLS POSSESS MEN
LIKE children and neurotics man as a political animal lives in a world
riddled with bugbears and tabus - a dream-world of symbols in which
the shadows loom far larger than the realities they represent.2 Political
thinkers as diverse as the English idealists and the classical Marxians8
have incurred a common fallacy: they have taken their own sense of
the logical relation of things and read it into the way men behave.
Actually men behave in their political lives with a disheartening illogi-
cality.4 They live in a jungle of fear, filled with phantoms of what they
tEditor, THE NATION.
This is the first chapter of a book to be published in the fall by the Viking Press, under
the title THE DIVINE RIGHT OF JUDGES: A STUDY IN THE AMERICAN SUPREMa COURT.
It will be readily apparent in this essay how much I owe to other writers: to Corwin,
The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol (1936) 30 AM. POL. Soi. REV. 1071 (Har-
vard Tercentenary address); to Schechter, The Early History of the Tradition of the
Constitution (1915) 9 AMi. POL. Sc. REV. 707; to Hamilton, Constitutionalism (1931)
4 ENcYC. Soc. SCIENCES 255; to ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMEN;T (1935); to
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). This essay is in a sense a gloss on their
combined text. I have, incidentally, used rather freely sentences from my series of
articles, The Riddle of the Supreme Court (1936) 142 NATION 121, 213, 273, 379.
1. COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 270.
2. Sigmund Freud's profound although erratic insights into the human mind
have not yet been measurably appropriated by social theory. His own attempts to apply
his method to the problems of culture, including his CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(Riviere trans. 1930), are readable but rudimentary. Modem readers will still find
BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS (1873) and WALLAS, HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS
(3d ed. 1914) suggestive; while the first writer was a conservative and the second a
Fabian, both were radical in the sense that they refused to believe in the fiction that
man is a rational animal. The most valuable dislocations of our political thinking have
come from the classical anthropologists, such as Tylor and Frazer-dislocations which
I have tried to describe in an (unsigned) survey of anthropological trends, Introduc-
tion (1930) 1 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 199-203. We are still awaiting a commentary on
Aristotle's "Man is a political animal," written by someone who has mastered the in-
sights of modern psychology and anthropology.
3. For the English idealists, see LASKI, THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1935) c. 1 ("The Philosophic Conception of the State"). The rationalism of the
classical Marxians seem to me their greatest weakness; nor have the contemporary
Marxians yet succeeded in effecting a fusion between their profoundly valid theory
of history and a usable psychology.
4. Illogical behavior and logical rationalization of that behavior go hand in hand.
This is the core of truth in PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY (Livingston and Bongiorno
trans. 1935). For the American reader Thurman Arnold's book, SYMBOLS OF GOVERN-
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have heard and imagined and been told. Their world is the world of a
child's nightmares -dark and brooding, crowded with dreads and anxi-
eties, with the distortions of real objects, with the cruellest nonsequiturs
and anti-climaxes.
That is why men always find themselves forced to seek some symbol
of divine right. Talk to the men on the street, the men in the mines
and factories and steel-mills and real-estate offices and filling stations,
dig into their minds and even below the threshold of their conscious-
ness, and you will in the main find that Constitution and Supreme Court
are symbols of an ancient sureness and a comforting stability. If you
watch the black-robed justices as they come filing in, if you listen to
them read their opinions, you will be strong not to succumb to a sense
of the Court's timelessness. Americans have been told that they are a
people without a tradition, without a culture.' And it does in truth
seem surprising that the restless, unstable energies of the American
people should have created anything that seems as deep-rooted and as
timeless as the Supreme Court. Even today, in its new and imposing
building,' the Court still wears the ancient garments of divine right.
The building has changed since the days of John Jay and John Marshall;
the fashionables, the men of power, the plain men and women who
come to visit the Court have changed; there is even that strange and
modern creature, a "press contact man," to explain to correspondents
the mysteries of a writ of certiorari and a dissenting opinion. But
despite these concessions to the spirit of the times, the Court maintains
its tough historical fiber. It has the knack that it seems to have borrowed
from the English institutions - that of managing to survive somehow
with its eye peeled continually on the past. It has, to be sure, walked
along the evolutionary path, but only as Orpheus once walked along the
pathway out of Hell - with its head turned backward.
What accounts for the extraordinary toughness and viability of the
Court? Why has it emerged from its mortal combats with Presidents,
presidential candidates and political reformers from Jefferson to Roose-
velt II relatively unscathed? The defenders of the Court answer that
MENT (1935), is much more to the point than Pareto. One of the most suggestive and
readable explorations of irrationality and rationalization in the western world is still
ROBINSON, THE MIND IN THE MAKING (1921).
5. Especially by the English commentators. This has been the principal elemnnt
in what James Russell Lowell called "a certain condescension" in them. It is notable
that no Englishman, with the recent exceptions of Harold Laski and D. NV. Brogan,
has concerned himself much with American judicial review. Bryce was not particularly
acute about it. And even Dicey made the mistake of seeing judicial review as an
inherent part of the federal structure.
6. For an amusing description of the new building and the Washington folklore
that has already clustered around it, see PEARSON AND ALLEN:, THE NiNE OLD MErN
(1936) c. 1 ("The Taj Mahal").
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its survival indicates the hollowness of the attacks on it.7 The assump-
tion seems to be that what is involved is a mediaeval ordeal by fire,
proving innocence. But the successive crises of the judicial power can
no more be exorcised by this sort of mumbo-jumbo than can the crises
of the economic system. They cannot be explained away merely as
"the same old story." The attacks on the Court's power have been real
enough and dangerous enough. Its survival thus far shows that it has
deep historical and psychological roots in American life: it has a clear
relation to the development of the power of business enterprise; it has
a strong symbolic hold over the American mind.
Most clearly and simply I should put it as follows: the nature and
extent of the Supreme Court's power are best understood by seeing it
as our basic instrument of sovereignty- an integral part of the Amer-
ican capitalist economic order. But the support of the judicial power
lies largely in the psychological realm; its roots are in the minds of the
people. Historically the judicial power must be seen as the instrument
of the few; psychologically it is the symbol of the many. "We live by
symbols," wrote Mr. Justice Holmes. It is to the Supreme Court and
the Constitution as symbols that we must first turn.
8
Men have always used symbols in the struggle for power, but only
latterly have we grown aware generally of their importance. For realistic
students of government today. know that the state is not ruled, as the
unwary reader of Plutarch might suppose, by copy book maxims and
civic virtues.' They know that one of the essential techniques of power-
groups is to manipulate the most effective symbols in such a way that
they become instruments of mass persuasion. The World War with
7. This is the contention of Charles Warren, James M. Beck, Senator Beveridge,
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, and David Lawrence, who have been the principal recent
architects of an apologetic for the Court.
8. It is necessary to say that the next two chapters of the book deal respectively
with the relation of the Supreme Court to the realities of political power and of the
economic system. Together the three chapters form Part I, under the title "The Court
in the American Scheme."
9. The power of ideas, symbols and myths, regardless of their validity, to rule men's
rinds in politics goes back, of course, to the Platonic myths; it reaches through Machia-
velli to its modern fruition in SoaEL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE (Hulme trans. 1914),
from which writer it was presumably derived by Mussolini. It is noteworthy that Sorel,
as well as Pareto, was an assiduous student of Greek culture; and Mussolini's fealty
to Machiavelli is made explicit in the dictator's introduction to a French translation of
THE PRINcE. I have profited much, in my thinking on the social myth, from discussions
with Professor W. Y. Elliott; see his PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS (1928). The
most systematic treatment of the role of symbols in the making of the civic mind will
be found in the series of volumes edited by C. E. Merriam, notably in Merriam's own
summary volume, THE MAKING OF CITIZENS (1931), and in KosoK, MODERN GER'MANY
(1933). See also Harold Lasswell's works, especially WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL
INSECURITY (1935) and POLITICS: WHo GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936).
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its use of propaganda brought that lesson home,10 and if it was not
clear at the end of the war, it has become clear enough through Euro-
pean experience with fascist and communist governments. 'Men are
notably more sensitive to images than to ideas, more responsive to stere-
otypes than to logic, to the concrete symbol than to the abstraction.
Today we all recognize the power of the newest devices such as the radio,
the movies, the press, to act as instruments of social cohesion, and to
line up an entire nation behind a single set of interests. The established
weapon of dictators has become the microphone.1 " But these techniques
depend for their effectiveness upon the symbols that they manipulate,
and the symbols depend in turn upon the entire range of association that
they invoke. The power of these symbols is enormous. Men possess
thoughts, but symbols possess men. -
Actually the whole of a culture is shot through with symbolism. Man
is under the constant necessity, writes Thurman Arnold, of putting
on ceremonial robes, and watching himself go by. 3 There are symbols
like the flag and the national anthem that are clearly recognized as such
-well-defined abbreviations of the national culture, sometimes called
"referential symbols" because they refer directly to the things they sym-
bolize. But the more important symbols, because their working is more
obscure, are the "condensation symbols," which Edward Sapir defines




This is the symbolism to be found in neurotic behavior, in the life of
savages, in the heavily charged symbolic atmosphere of religion and
politics.
The Supreme Court as symbol goes hand in hand with the Constitu-
tion as symbol. Since the Supreme Court is popularly considered as
exercising a guardianship over the Constitution, the result has been to
invest the judges of the Court with all the panoply of sanctity with
which the Constitution has itself been invested.lD This has had for
American history an importance that can scarcely be overestimated. Con-
10. Two of the important American books derive from the war e.'perience: LAS-
WELT, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE AND THE WORLD VAR (1927) and LiPrMA:;., Punrc
OPiNIoNx (1922) ; it is from Lippmann that I have gotten the concept of the stereotype.
It is not surprising that it is especially in periods of social unrest that the attention of
social theory should turn to the irrational elements in mass psychology.
11. I take the phrase from Guy Stanton Ford's Introduction to the symposium,
DICTATORSHIP IN THE MODERN WORLD (1935).
12. 1 owe this sentence to Professor Hermann Kantorowicz, now of the University
of London.
13. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) iii.
14. In his suggestive article on Symbolism (1934) 14 ENcYc. Soc. ScIEc Cs 492,
493. I owe a good deal of my analysis of symbolism to this article, as also to Arnold,
the Merriam series, and VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LusURE CIAss (3d ed. 1918).
15. This is discussed at greater length at pp. 1303-10 infra.
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stitutions, like all creations of the human mind and the human will, have
an existence in men's imagination and men's emotions quite apart from
their actual use in ordering men's affairs. This function has been called
"constitutionalism," which Walton Hamilton has defined as "the name
given to the trust which men repose in the power of words engrossed
on parchment to keep a government in order."" Edward S. Corwin, in
his Harvard Tercentenary paper, 17 has pointed out that the Constitution
has two aspects: it is an instrument and a symbol. As an instrument
it must be viewed hardheadedly and used flexibly to promote the people's
welfare in the present and future. As a symbol it is part of the mass
mind, capable of arousing intense popular hysteria, loaded with a terrible
inertia, its face turned toward the past.
II. CONSTITUTION INTO FETISH
To understand the fetishism of the Constitution one would require
the detachment of an anthropologist. Every tribe needs its totem and its
fetish, and the Constitution is ours. Every tribe clings to something
which it believes to possess supernatural powers, as an instrument for
controlling unknown forces in a hostile universe. This is true of civilized
nations as well. len need always something on which to fix their emo-
tions, whether positively in the form of adoration or deification, or
negatively in the form of a tabu. Like every people, the American people
have wanted some anchorage, home link with the invariant.
"Change and decay in all around I see,
Oh, Thou who changest not, abide with me."
And the Rock of Ages has been as essential in the politics of America
as in its religion. In fact the very habits of mind begotten by an authori-
tarian Bible and a religion of submission to a higher power have been
carried over to an authoritarian Constitution and a philosophy of sub-
mission to a "higher law;" and a country like America, in which its
16. Hamilton, Constitutionalism (1931) 4 E-cyc. Soc. ScIENCEs 255. See also
FRIEnRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1937), especially c. 8-10, for
a view of constitutionalism that differs from Hamilton's.
17. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrumcnt and as Symnbol (1936) 30 AMt. POL.
Sci. RFv. 1071. Corwin's contrast between the Constitution as symbol and as instru-
ment will, like so many of his analyses, prove fruitful for constitutional theory. I have
only one warning. "Instrument" may be used in two senses: in one it means, as with
Corwin, a frame of government adequate to the weight placed upon it; in another sense
it may mean a technique for defeating the democratic will. In this second sense the
principal instrument has been the power of judicial review. The true antithesis would
place on the one side a pragmatic use of the Constitution, whether through liberal inter-
pretation or through constitutional change; on the other side the symbolism of Consti-
tution and Court going hand in hand with the instrument of judicial review.
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early tradition had prohibited a state church, ends by getting a state
church after all, although in a secular form.
Someday there will be an historian with insight and imagination
enough to write the real religious history of America. It will not be
the history of formal churchgoing religion, nor even that of the sects
and the hellfire revivalists. It will be on the one hand the worship of
the dynamo and the gods of business enterprise; it will be on the other
hand the worship of the Constitution and the Supreme Court. For in
the first pair Americans have made concrete the deepest strivings of their
nature and era -the quest of what William James called "the bitch-
goddess Success." In the second pair they have made concrete their
own hopes and fears for their social order.
If we wish to understand with some sense of immediacy the early
American hopes and fears we have only to look at the Soviets today.
Travellers returning from Russia agree that the Russian people are filled
with a sense of the revolutionary role they have played and the great-
ness of their destiny. We get from contemporary records a similar
sense of America in its days of early statehood. Even as late as 1831,
young Alexis de Tocqueville, travelling through the new America and
contrasting it with the Europe he had just left, was impressed by one
thing: the feeling that Americans had of being the carriers of a new
philosophy of democracy and equality, the sense they had of their
peculiar mission in world history. 8
Actually, of course, all peoples have one time had this sense of unique-
ness and mission, although in the older cultures it tends to wear off
and a revolution of some sort or other is needed to renew it. Robert
Michels has spoken of the two basic myths of patriotism - the myth
of unique national origin (der Mythits der 11oher) and the myth of
unique national destiny (der Myth ts der W1ohia).'" In America the
two converged in the myth of a democratic revolution and a revolu-
tionary democracy. Americans took geat pride in their revolution,
although it must be noted that the pride increased in retrospect as the
revolution receded, the revolutionary energy ebbed and the democratic
elan grew too dangerous for the men of substance.
The rhetoric of national unity marked the beginning of Constitution
worship.2' The people rejoiced that the disunity of the Confederation
18. DE TOc2UEVILE. Dmaocrucy IN THE UNITED STATFS (Reeve trans. 1S93).
19. MficELs, DEm PATRiOrISmuS (1929).
20. For much of the material in this section dealing with the first decade of the
Constitution I am deeply indebted to Schechter's pathbreating article, The Early His-
tory of the Tradition of the Constitution (1915) 9 A r. PoL Scr. REv. 707. I have
borrowed from him not only several of the quotations, but much of the perspective. I
fear he errs, however, in attributing too happy a set of consequences to the tradition
of the Constitution; if it exercised a cohesive force, it lent itself also to the uses of
ruling minority groups.
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had been turned into the unity of the Constitution. To be sure, only
about five per cent of the country voted on ratification. But there seems
little doubt that most of the rest, for all their suspicions that their
liberties might be taken away from them, were not averse to the change.
A correspondent wrote to Rufus King in 1787:
"Our people expect so much happiness from the doings of the Con-
vention that they stand ready to adopt anything which may be
offered." 21
Partly the spontaneous result of this expectancy, partly planned and
prompted by the Federalist supporters of ratification, processions were
held in 1788 in Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Baltimore, Charleston
and New Haven to celebrate the ratification. In them mechanics marched
side by side with noteholders and merchants. An opponent called the
Boston procession "a great fulsome parade;" it "may serve to please
children, but freemen will not be so easily gulled out of their liberties."
That the children were pleased was more important than the gentleman
knew. The procession, wrote a Philadelphian to a friend in another
city,
"has made such an impression on the minds of our young people
that 'federal' and 'union' have now become part of the household
words of every family in the city."
22
It was on these "young people" that the success of the new government
depended; and when "union" became a household word half the task
was done.
What with real enthusiasm and drummed-up eloquence, the myth of a
perfect Constitution got off to a fine start. William Maclay, whose acid
words in his journal ate away many of the contemporary pretensions
but none the less recorded them, wrote in 1791:
"It has been usual with declamatory gentlemen, in their praises of
the present Government, . . . to paint the state of the country
under the old Congress as if neither wood grew nor water ran in
America before the happy adoption of the new Constitution." 23
What eased the path of Constitution-worship further was the fact
that the new government was ratified on the ascending arc of a period
of prosperity. It was thus possible to attribute to the government not
21. 1 KING, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING (1894) 259; quoted in
Schechter, supra note 20, at 717.
22. HOPxiNSON, AN- AccouNT OF THE GRAND FEDERAL PROCESSION (2d ed. 1788)
appendix; quoted in Schechter, supra note 20, at 718.
23. JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY (1929 ed.) 399; quoted in Schechter, supra
note 20, at 720.
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only those effects which genuinely flowed from the stopping of the
trade wars and the increased sense of confidence among the mercantile
groups, but those also which, because of a war-locked Europe, were for
a quarter century to play economically into the hands of America."4 On
the crest of this wave of prosperity the exultation over the new America
was converted into the tradition of a perfect Constitution. Undoubtedly
the sponsors of the new government were happy to have the decision
about their work transferred from the plane of debate over principles
to the plane of emotion and faith.
There were some, like James Madison in his famous tenth essay of
the Federalist, who saw that faction founded upon disparate property
interests lay at the core of all government; but that meant merely that
they and others were grateful for the emergence of a rhetoric of the
national interest to push class interests into the background. 2' How
Constitution-worship could be used thus was illustrated in the early,
jockeyings of the Federalists and anti-Federalists for positions of ad-
vantage. At first the anti-Federalists opposed ratification. But when
it became clear that the new government was popular, the Jeffersonian
party accepted its defeat and sought even to train the enemies' guns
back on them. In doing this the Jeffersonians had the precedent of a
skilful manoeuver by which, in 1787 and 1788, the nationalists under
the leadership of Hamilton had appropriated the name "Federalists"
with all the emotional associations of decentralization and states'-rights
that went with it. It was a daring stroke, "this clearly conscious phil-
ological ambuscade into which the American masses fell.""-  But Jef-
ferson was no less daring and in the long run more effective when he
and his party abandoned their opposition to the Constitution and became
the eager rivals of the Federalists in worshipping it. Both parties showed
an amazing unanimity in pointing out the perfections of the Constitu-
tion; they delighted in honoring it, and they measured their distance
from each other by reciprocal charges of violating it and departing from
its spirit. Their divergences were those of interpretation.
24. "American agriculture vibrated in its fortunes with every turn in the European
balance of power." I BEARD, THE RISE OF A.mERtcz CIVILIZATION (1927) 391.
25. The students of today have accepted too uncritically the epithet "faction" vhich
was always hurled at attempts to build up a party system. The reason that Federalist
theorists were so bitter at the idea of faction was that they feared the party system
would show where the majority stood: the rise of parties has been thus the principal
instrument for making democratic government effective. Parrington [1 PAXMINGTONZ,
MAIN CURRENTS IN AMTERICAN THOUGHT (1927)] sees this clearly, in his discussion of
political theory at the Constitutional convention; so also does BEARD, Ecoo:moc Orunms
OF JEFFERSONIAx DEMOCRAcY (1915) especially c. 1 and 8. On Madison in this connec-
tion see BEARD, THE IDEA OF NATIONAL INTEREST (1934) c. 1.
26. Schechter, supra note 20, at 714.
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Thus the Constitution was serving its purpose as an anchorage of
government against the storms of party strife. W. H. Crawford of
Georgia had ample reason to complain when he said in 1811 in the
House of Representatives:
"It has become so extremely fashionable to eulogize the Constitu-
tion, whether the object of the eulogy is the extension or contraction
of the powers of the government, that whenever its eulogium is pro-
nounced, I feel an involuntary apprehension of mischief."
' 27
His barb was delightful; but it was this very fact that all parties had
become rival worshippers in the cult of the Constitution which proved
the greatest stabilizing force in the new government. Always the task
of a state has been to find some object of common allegiance which would
allow internal quarrels to rage within the fabric of government without
destroying it.2S A generation like ours, living in a "time of troubles,"2
can understand the value of the symbol of national unity and the fetishism
of the Constitution in cementing internal order.
But when we have allowed for the rhetoric of national unity, the
persuasion of prosperity, the advantages of having a safety valve to let
off the steam of party conflict; when we have added the propaganda
of clergymen, lawyers, editors, teachers, we have not completed our
analysis. Deeper than any of these were forces operating on the less
conscious levels of the popular mind. One was the belief that ordinary
people, as well as lawyers, have in word-magic. The American was the
first written national Constitution. What matter that it was a broad path-
way of government rather than a fixed and narrow code of law? The very
definiteness with which the design for a government was set down in
27. Quoted in Corwin, supra note 17, at 1077.
28. Von Hoist, in his chapter on constitution-worship in America [1 VON HoLsT,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (Lalor and Mason
trans. 1881) c. 2], quotes Governor Hamilton of South Carolina on "the beauty of our
Constitution" at the very moment when Hamilton was nominated as president of the
nullification convention in 1832, and Alexander Stephens to the same effect only a
month before he became Vice-President of the Confederate States. This "contradiction"
fascinated Von Holst and even made him angry, which is not surprising when we re-
member that Von Hoist was passionately influenced by the German constitutional
movement, and wished earnestly to believe in the integrity of constitutionalism. But the
serious count in the rhetoric above is not that it was out of line with the behavior of
the two Southerners. It is rather that while in 1832 the rhetoric served its purpose,
in 1861 it did not. That purpose was to settle internal clashes without resort to blood-
shed.
29. The phrase is from 1 TOYNBEE, A STUDY Or HISTORY (1934) 53. The term
"crisis" is best restricted to a specific situation of breakdown in a national culture;
thus, an "economic crisis" or a "constitutional crisis." Toynbee used "time of troubles'!
to apply to the stage of breakdown through which the larger cultures pass, such as
the culture of the western world today.
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words on parchment was enough to command admiration and then rever-
ence. 30 What was wanted was a visible symbol of the things that men
hold dear. The American people had conquered a domain from its
natives, wrested the sovereignty over it from the greatest power in
Europe, fought their way to liberty. They wanted a visible mark of
their accomplishment: ecce signion. And they wanted it all the more
strongly as they began to suspect that in the process of consolidating
their regime they had lost sight of their original impulsions and the
goals they had dreamt of. What they did, to still their doubts, was what
every man does when troubled about his failure to realize his youthful
dreams: they sought a way by which their revolutionary ideals could
be worshipped without being followed. They found their peace in the
safe haven of the Constitution. Here was the document into which the
Founding Fathers had poured their wisdom as into a vessel; the Fathers
themselves grew ever larger in stature as they receded from view; the
era in which they lived and fought became a golden age; in that age
there had been a fresh dawn for the world, and its men were giants
against the sky; what they had fought for was abstracted from its living
context and became a set of "principles," eternally true and universally
applicable."1 When the Americans began seeing the revolutionary heroes
in the hazy light of semi-divinity and began getting them associated or
confused with the framers of the Constitution, the work of consoli-
dating the new government was assured. The Golden Age had become
a political instrument.
The amazing function that the Constitution as symbol performed
was to serve as a link between the revolutionary ferment of the 1770's
30. On word-magic, see Kenneth Burke's suggestive, if somewhat chaotic bao!:,
P=ANENCE AND CHANGE (1935). There is an item in the article, The Constitution
of the United States (July, 1936) 14 FORTUNE 56, where it is reported that of the
thousands who stream through the Library of Congress to gaze at the document
in its glass case, many fall to their knees before the magic of the word that holds their
national destiny. There are some, of course, who ask to see the signatures of Chris-
topher Columbus and Colonel Lindbergh; but when was ignorance ever held a bar to
the appreciation of magic?
31. The process described here is obviously not restricted to American history. It
forms the theme also of Carl Becker's brilliant HFAvENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTM.TsH
CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932). The appeal to a Golden Age is a common thing in the
history of national emotions and political tactics. In fact, Americans were only carry-
ing on what the English had done in their struggle for Parliamentary libe2rties when
they had appealed to a Golden Age of primitive Saxonism, with its reliance on the
sturdy and deep-rooted habit of meeting in assemblies, as against the Golden Age of the
Briton kings, which the Tudor and Stuart apologists sought to emphasize. See Bratm-
L.EY, ARTHURA R LEGENm N THE SEVENT CENTURY (1932). I owe much of
my thinking in this matter to Edwin Mins, Jr., of Harvard, and to Borgese's article
on Primitvism (1934) 12 ENcYc. Soc. ScIENcas 393, which is a mine of suggestion.
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and the new nationalist government of the propertied minority... On the
one hand the prosperity and the sense of order that accompanied the
new regime were attributed to the Constitution; by a process of abbre-
viation, one said "Constitution" when onL meant the new government,
thereby assigning to the instrument what was intended for the whole
organism. On the other hand, by a process of association, one also said
"Constitution" when one meant the ideals for which the revolution had
been fought. thereby investing a conservative document with the halo
of a revolutionary movement. That the Constitution could serve thus
as a link between the Boston Tea Party and Hamilton's Report on Man-
ufactures, between the Declaration of Independence and Dr. Timothy
Dwight's speeches as President of Yale University, is a tribute not so
much to the document itself or the wisdom of its framers; it is a tribute
ultimately to the ironic sequence of events in history, and to men's ca-
pacity for fashioning myths that will allow them to adjust themselves
to that sequence. 3  One could, if a dash of cynicism were allowable,
lay it down as a political axiom that at least in the early stages of a
revolutionary regime a constitution is worshipped in inverse proportion
as it embodies the principles for which the revolution was fought. and
in direct proportion as it succeeds in creating a framework for order and
prosperity.
But the Constitution was no static symbol. Its fortunes were entrusted
to the perilous voyage of the union experiment. There were two power-
ful thrusts at work in the period before the Civil War-one toward
nationalism, the other toward particularism; one emphasizing the needs
of survival for the whole, the other clinging to the assertions of free-
dom for the parts. The quarrel was not one carried on in the void;
it mounted in passion and intensity because with it were involved the
fortunes of slave-holding and of industrialism. But it is important to
note that the fight over these issues of economic interest and state policy
32. The Constitution as it was framed and ratified was, of course, far from a
revolutionary document; the new government was a republic rigged up with contriv-
ances for safeguarding the interests of the propertied minority. But the symbolic power
of a Constitution was recognized very early by those who had the sharpness to pierce
history. Tom Paine, revolutionist as he was, saw from the beginning the power that
lay in a "charter" for lashing down the allegiance of the masses to the new regime:
"Let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth
placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the
world may know that so far we approve monarchy that in America the law is King."
PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776); quoted in Corwin, supra note 17, at 1074. This was in
1776, but as a good propagandist Paine was already drawing the blueprints of consti-
tution-worship.
33. Americans of the 1790's were able the better to adjust themselves to the contra-
diction of their position through the figure of George Washington, who spanned the
transition from the old fervor to the new order, and who was utilized to the hilt as a
symbol.
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had to be waged with constitutional brickbats. That is why the principal
figures in the struggle were constitutional lawyers. They were the heroes
in a war of words. On the nationalist and industrialist side the great
figures were John Marshall on the bench, Daniel W~ebster and Henry
Clay off it, and Joseph Story whether on or off. On the localist-slaveo-
cracy side were Roger Taney on the bench and John C. Calhoun and
Thomas Benton off it. And in the wake of these judges and legal
scholars came their camp-followers - the nation of amateur constitu-
tional lawvyers. 4 It was in this period, it must be remembered, in the
early 1830's that De Tocqueville came to America and put down his
observation that every issue of policy with us was first translated into
constitutional terms and debated as a legal issue.35
But in the thickest of the battle, the Constitution itself went un-
questioned. In fact, the more hotly the diverse interpretations of it
were contested, the more unwaveringly did both sides pay homage to it.
The climax of the war of words came in 1830, in the debate in the
Senate between Webster and Havne. There is a sultry magnificence in
Webster's Reply to Hayne, which quickens the blond even of the skepti-
cal reader today. 7 But more important is the fact that this debate was
the climax of the attempt to solve national problems through constitu-
tional symbols; and the attempt was a failure.
-Vebster's speeches represent the high point of the establishment of
the Constitutional tradition. Never before had men been so aware of
the full emotional meaning of national unity. He urged the Consti-
tution as a completed contract between the people themselves - insme-
diate, fundamental, irrevocable, sacred. But it was not so much his
legalistic arguments as the finality and fervor of his statement of them
that counted. The notion of a united people superior to the will of the
states now emerged. and became identified with the Constitution. This
notion came to its full consciousness on the rising arc of our national
life, when the emerging industrialism was creating in economic terms
34. Corwin's remark is worth quoting: "Many other countries, too--most of them.
in fact-have written constitutions, but 'the constitutional lawyer' is a unique product
of our system." CORWI,. THE TWiLi0IT OF THE SUPREME Coeirr (1934) :.xii.
35. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE. op. ci. supra note 18. at 284.
36. This debate has been insufficiently studied in terms both of its symbolic and
of its economic context. I have found the comments of Warren 11 WAnFrEz. TuE Su-
PREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (2d ed. 1926) c. 131 and Fuess [I DANE,.I
WEBSTER (1930) c. 15] valuable despite-perhaps because of-my disagreement with
their interpretation. Parrington's sketch of Webster [2 PAnnINr O.V. op. Cit. sI pra
note 25. at 304-16] is brilliant. So also is Charleq Beard', discussion in Tit Eca e oit
BAsIs OF POLITICS (1934 ed.) 33-40.
37. It is interesting that even the fleards 11 Brnt. Tutr Rtir oy \,tric. CIVI-
LIZATION (1927) 565], for all their usual tough-mindedness, are moved to a lyric strain
by his peroration.
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the organic sense of unity that Webster was trying to use to the pur-
poses of his class and outlook. Webster's speech was therefore a re-
sounding success. It sold as a pamphlet more widely than any other
pamphlet since Tom Paine's. It gave balm and re-assurance to a people
already troubled by the impending sectional conflict. The enormous
impression that Webster's oration made was, however, not due wholly to
the "godlike Daniel's" divine eloquence. It must be remembered that
this speech, and also the one he made three years later which with the
help of the Commentaries of Justice Story was more closely reasoned
as a piece of constitutional theory,"8 were both filled with a sort of in-
spired Constitution-worship. It was this which stirred the country.
That it did so was evidence of the hunger of the people, in the midst
of the incertitudes of the slavery debate, to be reassured by some com-
forting symbol. That symbol was an indivisible union resting upon a
sacred charter which was, in Webster's words a "Constitution," not a
"Confederacy."
But the hunger for a national symbolism was not enough to solve the
problems of sectional and class interests. Von Holst, writing of this
period from his vantage-ground after the Civil War, states quite clearly
the dual result that attended the use of constitutional debate as an instru-
ment of national policy:
"The Constitution afforded such a field for a war of words . . .
that . . . the erroneous view began to obtain currency in the third
decade of this century that all difficulty would end in a war of
tongues . . . the extraordinary dilatibility of the boundaries post-
poned the moment of the breach." 39
Von Holst was right in both respects. The common clinging to the
Constitution while disputes raged over its interpretation - the limita-
tion of the struggle to the arena of constitutional argument-did post-
pone the moment of the breach. But it was a dangerous method, for it
tended to lull men to an oblivion of the bitter realities involved in the
struggle. When they placed their complete reliance upon this "war of
words," the Civil War became not the irrepressible conflict but the in-
credible conflict. Hence the necessary economic and political adjustments
38. The 1833 speech, on "The Constitution not a Compact between the Sovereign
States" [6 WORKS (Natil. ed. 1903) 181] is the speech which best expresses Webster's
constitutional theory. There is fairly clear evidence that Webster got much of his
theory from Story. See 2 PARMNGTON, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 311. The Reply to
Hayne [6 WoRxs (Natl. ed. 1903) 3] is not his best constitutional argument, but it is
the best rhetorical statement, which is much more to our purpose.
39. 1 VoN HOLST, op. cit. supra note 28, at 78. It was in this period that the
fiftieth anniversary of the Constitution was celebrated. For a typical discussion, using
the occasion for a bitter indictment of the states'-rights doctrine, see JOHN QuINCY
ADAmS, THE JUBYI OF THE CoNsTrrumoN (1839).
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were not made.4" The politicians of the 1830's, like all politicians, finally
fell under the sway of their own rhetoric. They actually believed in the
efficacy of their legalistic arguments. They trusted in the sanctity of
the Union within the symbolism of the Constitution to preserve the
Union. The tragedy of Webster's Reply to Hayne was that symbolism
did not prove enough.
While the war itself was a tragic defeat for the efficacy of the con-
stitutional symbolism, the northern victory only served to confirm that
symbolism. As we shall see in the next section, however, the Constitution
itself was no longer asked to bear unaided the burden of solving the
problems which threatened the national unity. To the rhetoric of the
Constitution was added the divine right of judges and the yeoman's work
that the judicial power had to do. The heyday of constitutional sym-
bolism was over with the Civil War. I do not mean there was a slacken-
ing of constitutional fetishism. By no means. If anything, that fetishism
grew in passion and intensity. But it no longer had to bear the heavy
freightage of keeping party disputes in bounds and hemming economic
conflicts within the ambit of peaceful political brawls. After the Civil
War it is not too much to say that the function of constitutional sym-
bolism became auxiliary to the cult of the judicial power.'
Within these limits the Constitution has functioned as a symbol with
great effectiveness since the Civil War, and its very removal from the
area of direct conflict has made it more rigid and unyielding as a symbol.
As the continent was opened, and a new immigration poured in from
Europe, and the population moved toward the Pacific, new sectional,
racial and class cleavages emerged. The Constitution was more than
ever needed to tie together the loose bundle of faggots, the collocation
of races and peoples, the sprawling geographical expanse we call our
country. Henry Adams, musing on the Virgin and the dynamo, rifling
European capitals for the wisdom stored in their cathedrals and chan-
cellories, took the Constitution for granted, and had perforce to fall
back upon inexorable cycles of history in order to find some anchorage
in a shifting and turbulent cosmos. Not so the immigrant, first landed
40. The immediate context of the Webster-Hayne debate was the struggle over
the land question as related to the slavery question. The Beards [BEAnv, loc. cit. supra
note 37] point out that Webster sought to split the West from the South in their com-
mon struggle against northern industrialism, by yielding to the West on the land issue,
and by setting up a nationalist ideal to the appeal of which the West was not wholly
immune. But by relying too much on the latter, constitutional rhetoric, the Easterners
did not push their practical concessions far enough. If they had gone beyond Web-
ster's gesture to the West, "if they had then and there effected a union with the West
by yielding on the land question . . . they would have made the forces of the Union
a combination of power so formidable that secession would have scarcely dared to face
it." 1 id. at 565-66.
41. This will be elaborated at pp. 1310-12 infra.
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ol these shores, who found in the Constitution the certain guarantee of
stability that Adams had hunted for throughout Europe.42 The Consti-
tution has thus become since the Civil War principally an assimilative
and faggot-binding agency, betokening the encompassing tradition into
which all sorts of diverse traditions could pour themselves. And thus
for the children of the new industrial age, native and immigrant alike,
the Constitution became once more what it had been for the generations
that succeeded the Revolution - the symbol of a Golden Age. Only the
Golden Age, instead of lying in the past, lay in the future. It was located
no longer in the lost Atlantis of the Revolution; it was a gateway open-
ing on bright and illimitable vistas of the golden dollar.43 As the pe-
cuniary values of a capitalist society supplanted all others, the Consti-
tution was used more and more as a symbol to place a sanction upon
those values. It became merged in men's minds with the capitalist myth
of the career open to talents in the land of opportunity; the capitalist
legend and the constitutional legend blurred into one another until finally
their outlines could no longer be distinguished, and they themselves be-
came interchangeable. Which was as it should be in a capitalist democracy.
All this took place by no means spontaneously. The dynamics of
building the Constitutional symbol are lost for us among the myriad
daily activities of the past. What we do know is that the process of
building the Constitutional legend was equal to the task imposed. It
became the staple of after-dinner speeches at Bar Association meetings,
of occasional addresses by judges, of conventions of patriotic societies,
of class-room recitations and nation-wide contests sponsored by news-
papers, of talks before immigrant groups, of newspaper editorials in the
great urban centers and cross-road towns, of radio commentators and
movie newsreels. All the media through which popular opinion is created
and entrenched were enlisted in its service. Those who are curious will
find a revealing cross-section of the constitutional legend in the records
that have remained of the centenary celebration of the ratification of the
Constitution, held in Philadelphia in 1889."* But if some of the ex-
42. The part that the immigrants have played in building the effective symbolism
of American life has never been adequately explored. It seems clear, however, that
their role has been central and at the same time curiously dual. On the one hand, the
immigrants have with a naive eagerness tended to swallow whole both the myth of a
perfect Constitution and the myth of capitalist success; on the other hand, the "Ameri-
canism" which represents the fusion of the two myths has fed largely on native hatred
of immigrants.
43. The classic works on the capitalist myth in America are, of course, Thorstein
Veblen's. especially AnS ,xTEi O\\'FRSuIP (1923). Of value also is JOSEpHSON. Tup.
RoBBER BARONS (1934), especially the chapter *'What the Young Men Dream."
44. CARSON, ED.. HISTORY OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE 100T ANNIVERSARY OF THE
PROMULGATION OF TIE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1889). It is worth noting
that J. Franklin Jameson, writing in 1886. observed that increasing interest in the
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hibits in that record seem to some a bit archaic and baldly naive, let them
reflect that in the half-century that has elapsed the process has gone on
apace. That our constitutional commentaries have something of the
timbre of what the band plays at Fourth of July parades, should not
disconcert us. It is of the essence of such works that they should cele-
brate their fear of change under the guise of a passion for the moral
foundations of the Republic.
4
Latterly constitutionalism has tended to lose its original richness and,
as it has increasingly hardened into a fetish, to be turned with increasing
naivet6 to the purposes of reactionary groups. It has, of course, always
been true that not all who have made a fetish of the Constitution have
believed in it. Samuel Johnson said of patriotism that it was often the
last refuge of the scoundrel. This is true of Constitutionalism as well.
Many is the newspaper and political group in this country which appeals
to the sanctity of the Constitution with its eyes fixed on the immensities
and its hands reaching out for its own special interests. They are the
professional patrioteers, and they use the Constitution in a coldly instru-
mental way for their own purposes. The professional patrioteers may,
if we have luck, go the way of other excrescences on the body politic, and
be sloughed off in time. But for the present the fetishism of the Con-
stitution on the part of the common man, which has become so deeply
part of our tribal ways that it must be taken as a datum in our politics,
plays into the hands of all sorts of constitutional "leagues" and Ameri-
canism-mongers. It may perhaps be considered evidence of the dis-
integration of the constitutional symbol that what once served to weld
the discordant groups of a nation together has now become the easy
label of a whole host of "patriotic" organizations, whose purpose is to
stamp out any protest against the existing economic set-up and whose
function is to build a popular apologia for the present distribution of
power.
III. DIVINE RIGHT: AMERICAN PLAN
In a democracy in the twentieth century it may seem irreverent or
whimsical or even merely literary to talk of divine right. Yet very little
Constitution over the last few years had caused the State Department to tahe it out
of the "little tin box" and place it on exhibition. JAimiso, An INTmoDucrioi; 'TO TiE
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PoLrricAL HISToRY OF ThE UNITED STATES (185) 5.
45. Take, for example, the amazing book by Beck [TnE Co NSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1922)]-amazing not in that it differs so much from what 95 per cent
of the "constitutional lawyers" of today would write if they wrote books, but in that it
was written and published at all as a scholarly commentary. In his review of the book,
under the title Constitutional Metaphors (1925) 41 NEw REIumac 314, Thomas Reed
Powell has set down as pitiless a dissection of the anatomy of constitutionalism as
exists anywhere.
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is clearer in the American scheme than the fact that the cult of the
Supreme Court is the characteristic emotional cement by which Ameri-
can capitalism and American democracy are held together.40 The cele-
bration of the Supreme Court in the capitalist America of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries performs the same social function as the cele-
bration of kingship in the mercantilist Europe of the sixteenth to eight-
eenth centuries. On the main highways of the development of the
western world, what used to be the divine right of kings has been re-
placed by the divine right of judges.
I mean this, of course, as a rough analogy, and yet I mean something
beyond that too. The feudal economic system wore the panoply of idea
and allegiance furnished by the universal church. The mercantilist econ-
omic system that emerged in early modem times clothed itself in the
vestments of a kingship that would have the strength to break down and
override the princelings and local potentates who stood in the way of
the expanding economic unit; but it had to contend with the spiritual
authority of the church, and it did not shrink finally from claiming for
its kings the same divine right with which the church had invested
itself. In fact, as Figgis has pointed out,4T the great ideological strug-
gles of the sixteenth century were waged over the claims of the kingship
to divine right; and the crux of this struggle is reached when the abso-
lute monarchs in England evolved their dispensing power to set over
against the power of the Church to grant indilgences. It seems to be a
rule of the struggle for power that one species of appeal to divinity can be
displaced only by another. The divine right of the church had to yield to
the divine right of kings, which invested the absolute monarchy. That,
in turn, in the course of the Parliamentary struggles of the seventeenth
century in England and of the eighteenth and nineteenth century strug-
gles that followed in their wake on the Continent, had to give way to
the divine right of Parliaments; for representative institutions were able
to displace absolute monarchy only by grace of appealing to a "higher
law ;" the "divinity that doth hedge a king" was transformed into the
divine sanctions of some unchanging body of principles in terms of
which the king's acts had to be measured and weighed.
But the logic of development did not stop there. America, which has
carried capitalism to its highest peak of perfection, needed also a divine
sanction of unusual potency with which to invest it. Because our par-
liamentary institutions -our Congresses and Presidents- are poten-
tially too responsive to democratic impulses, the "higher law" was ex-
46. The nature of the judicial power in our state, how it has grown to its present
stature, how it functions in our political and economic system, must be left for later
chapters. Here we are concerned only with the strength of the symbolism in the
judicial power, and with the psychological ingredients which furnish that strength.
47. FiGGIs, THE DiVINE RIGHr oF KiNGs (2d ed. 1914).
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tended to hem in the acts of the people's representatives themselves. That
"higher law" was located in the Constitution, but being divine it could
not be contained even in that. So it overflowed and became a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky"48 which could be brought to earth only when
it was finally located in the minds of the men who took over the exclu-
sive function of interpreting the Constitution. As Brooks Adams wrote
in 1913, in his masterly Theory of Social Revolutionzs, by the "rule of
reason" in the Standard Oil case of 1911 which exempted the Oil Trust
from the operation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,49 the Court was
taking over the authority of the church to "grant indulgences for reason-
able causes."" From the mediaeval church to American finance-capitalism
the wheel has come a full turn. The divine right of judges has supplanted
not only the church hierarchy; the feudal aristocracy, the absolute mon-
archy, btlt finally even the institutions of parliamentary democracy, and
the Constitution itself.
There are three principal elements in the pattern of divine right as
it may be found in the popular mind. One is the fetishism of the Con-
stitution, the second is the claim of the Court to the exclusive guardian-
ship of the Constitution, and the third is the tradition of judicial neu-
trality. I have already dealt with the first in the previous section of this
article. To no small extent in the past century the fortunes of the Con-
stitution as symbol and the Supreme Court as symbol have been linked.
What enabled the propertied groups, in the last analysis, to make use
of the judicial power was the strength and evocative force of the Con-
stitutional tradition.
But this tradition, seen as a cohesive force for the nation, had one
great weakness, which I have already sought to suggest. It left the
gates wide open for divergent interpretations that, as shown by the
quarter-century that furnished a swift runway to Civil War, might grow
in passion and intensity until they led to open conflict. The Civil War
burned deep into the people the consciousness of the value of the con-
stitutional symbol; it burned even deeper the danger of the conflicting
interpretations of the fundamental law. As long as the polity had to cope
only with the oppositions of the party system, the constitutional sym-
bol was broad enough to contain those oppositions and give them scope
and play. But when the oppositions took on the fierceness of class and
sectional conflicts, and when two well-knit economies, each with its
emotional loyalties and intellectual rationalizations, met in a head-on
collision, it was clear that something more was required than the con-
48. The phrase is, of course, Holmes's, who was more canny in seeing through the
judicial symbols than any other incumbent on the CourL
49. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
50. ADAxts, THE THEORY OF SocIAL REVOLUTIONS (1913) 119-31.
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stitutional symbol. That something more was judicial review. Since an
open area for endless debate and conflict had been left in a federal frame-
work, based on the separation of powers and subject to a fundamental
law, that open area had to be closed. Some one had to be empowered
to decide finally how that fundamental law should be interpreted. The
decision might, of course, have been left to Congress, but that would
have been unthinkable before the Civil War to the slavery interest and
localist sentiment; it was unthinkable after the Civil War to the capitalist
interest, which above all else feared democracy. Something else had to
be found. The fetishism of the Constitution, as a flexible instrument
open to various construction, was in itself inadequate. In short, a faith
was not enough. It had to be a faith deposited in a power. That power
was the judicial power. The function of interpreting the Constitution
had to be specialized in a single tribunal.
Thus arose the second element in the pattern of divine right: the
exclusive claim of the Supreme Court to a guardianship of the Con-
stitution. John Marshall and Joseph Story urged it very early in our
history, primarily from the standpoint of safeguarding the Federalist
interests. Webster's Reply to Hayne is principally important as a de-
fense, not so much of the Constitution, as of the judicial power. It
is significant, as Charles Warren has pointed out,"' that it came at the
end of the first fierce attack on the judicial power since Jefferson's.
Webster saw the judicial power as adding a new bulwark for the proper-
tied interests to the bulwark of the Constitution 52 - which could be used
quite as much by Calhoun and Benton to their purposes as by Clay and
himself to their own. What Webster did not foresee was that even the
judicial power could be used by the enemy - if they captured the Court.
It was one of the ironic twists of history that the arrow which Webster
aimed at Hayne and the slaveocracy he stood for was picked up by
Taney, another champion of the slaveocracy, and aimed back at Webster
and the capitalism of the North. The Dred Scott decision was the
logical fulfillment of the Reply to Hayne.
From Marshall through Taney, and increasingly after the Civil War,
the Supreme Court offered to guard exclusively the charter of funda-
mental liberties. They offered to play the role of the Platonic guardians
that watched over the mythical Greek republic; they were ready to furnish
at once wisdom and militancy. Part of John Marshall's genius lay in his
skill in pushing into the background the power that the court was gain-
ing over economic policy, and thrusting into the foreground its role of
51. WARREN, 1oc. cit. supra note 36.
52. In the long Congressional debate that followed Webster's speech, the issue of
the judicial power was thrashed out at greater length than at any time since the Great
Judiciary Debate of 1802. In it one may find a full exposition of the claim of the
Court to the exclusive guardianship of the Constitution.
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guardianship. This the later judges have encouraged by their continued
utterances, and it has become the official theory of the court's power.
To be sure, the fact that the role of guarding the Constitution involved
also the power of deciding what the Constitution was, did not by a whit
diminish the ardor of the Court in offering its services. Like a jealous
Cyclops, it was willing to rule the domain that it guarded.
By the stress laid on this guardianship, the judges have been asso-
ciated in our minds with the function of protection rather than with the
struggle for power. This has been of enormous importance. It has con-
scripted to the service of the judicial symbol all the accumulated Anglo-
Saxon tradition of the "rule of law." 3as America carried it over from
England. But this tradition was in a vague way and under the form of
"natural law" itself a carry-over from the Middle Ages. It had become
domesticated in England -first, in the subjection of King John to the
Magna Charta of the barons at Runnymede; later, by the rising English
middle class, acting through Edward Coke, the tough and sturdy Lord
Chief Justice stubbornly fighting royal prerogative in the cause of Par-
liamentary liberties, and writing a magnificent commentary on Magna
Charta which was more influential than was the instrument itself in
building up the conception of the rule of law. This idea - of the sub-
jection of all public officials to a higher law that is "common" not only
in the sense that it is available to all men but also in the sense that it
exempts none- was carried over into the American colonies, and took
the form here of the conception of the Constitution as a "fundamental
law."' n It cropped up timorously in some of the early cases that are
now cited as forerunners of Marbury v. Madisonj'5 and in that case
took its first long step toward being converted into the doctrine of judi-
cial review. It has been the principal ideological force bolstering judicial
review, as a necessary doctrine in "a government of laws and not of
men." It is an influence that lingers today in the minds of those who
53. I have found Dean Pound's article [Ride of Law (1934) 13 Er.cc. Soc. ScIaE.cEs
463] illuminating. I have not spoken in the text of one of our links to English legal
development-the fact that there is a basic character which the possession of a "com-
mon law" gives to a people. The emphasis on this by such writers as Pound is ex-
pressed in phrases like "the spirit of the common law," "the genius of the common
law." The latest commentator to stress this is, significantly enough, a student whose
thinking was formed under the influence of continental juristic thought-Max Ascoli.
See his INTELLIGENCE IN POLITICS (1936), especially the suggestive section on American
legal institutions and the national character, at 120-42. I am willing enough to accept
such an approach, provided one is aware of the danger of slipping into the Coist-
mongering of the Savigny school; provided also one adds that a common law not only
helps create the national character, but is itself hammered out along with other insti-
tutions by the driving set of forces in the history of the culture.
54. For a useful summary and analysis of the "higher la," theories, see HAINES,
TIIE RE~vivAL OF NATURAL LAw CoNcEns (1930).
55. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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have never heard of Coke, and who do not know the meaning - much
less the "spirit"- of the common law.
From Coke, to Marshall, Story and Chancellor Kent, to Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, to the New Deal cases is a series of legal
steps, but the continuity in them is the appcal to a higher law in the
interests of the mercantile and industrial class. There is one paradox
worth noting: in England, Coke's doctrine has been maintained only
so far as it called for a legal check upon the monarch, but not so far as
it applied to a legal check upon the Parliament; in America the check
was placed both on the executive and legislature. From having such a
check it was only a step to identify it with the Constitution, and from
that point only another step to identify it with the guardians and inter-
preters of the Constitution, and thus to establish judicial supremacy.
The paradox, however, resolves itself when ideas are referred back to
the interests they serve. It was no accident that the idea of the rule of
law was among the reigning forces at our nativity as a nation. It is
historically, as well as psychologically, linked with the development and
power of the middle class in the western world. It is part of the body
of liberal doctrine that the middle class forged in the centuries during
which it was clearing its way to power, and that the same class used
as a rationalization and as an instrument for achieving power 0 Just as
it was useful originally to the rising capitalist class in removing the
obstruction of monarchical and aristocratic interference, so it is useful
now to the entrenched capitalist class in fighting off the threat of demo-
cratic and labor groups.
Its emphasis has changed, but it has kept its function and its psy-
chological appeal. It has found favorable soil in America, where there
has always been a dominant legalistic strain and an elaborate respect
for the legal fabric of things. And it has been cherished most by the
liberal tradition in American life, which has done little to orient itself
to the new demands made upon it by changing industrialism, and which
is still fighting all over again the battles of the Stuart periodY
This brings us to the third element in the pattern of divine right:
the tradition of judicial neutrality. The judges could not be proper
56. I borrow here, of course, from LAsKI, THE RISE OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM
(1936), which seems to me enormously valuable as an attempt to apply the Marxian
methodology to the history of western social thought; see my review, Liberalisn's
Family Tree (1936) 143 NATIO, 396; see also for a different view, Coker, Book Re-
view (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1096.
57. "Against an unplanned and undirected industrialism, and its imminent hazards
to life, liberty, and property, we have no constitutional rights. But thanks to John
Locke,-or to the thinkers, statesmen, warriors, business men, and jurists who put the
punch in his words,-we have adequate safeguards against the resort by any state to the
kind of stuff the Stuart kings used to pull." Hamilton, Property-According to Locke
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 864, 880.
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guardians of the Constitution unless they approached it with detachment.
We have somehow managed in our minds to place the juzdges above
the battle. Despite every proof to the contrary, we have persisted in
attributing to them the objectivity and infallibility that are ultimately
attributes only of godhead. The tradition persists that they belong to
no economic group or class; that they are not touched by economic
interests; that their decisions proceed through some inspired way of
arriving at the truth; that they sit in their robes like the haughty gods
of Lucretius, high above the plains on which human beings swarm,
unaffected by the preferences and prejudices that move common men.
There is a curious cult of judges that has grown up in America.
President Taft, in the 1912 campaign, said with a trace of seriousness
that he believed that Heaven got its quality from the judicial character.
No German bourgeois ever surrendered himself more completely to the
commanding dignity of a Geheinzrat, no pre-Soviet peasant ever bowed
lower to the Czar's tax-collector, than we bow before the judicial sym-
bol. Office-holding is, in a democratic state, at best a paradox: we seek
after election day to invest with authority a man whom we have the day
before impaled upon our invective as the blackest sort of scoundrel.
In this sense, democratic government is a perpetual phoenix-renewal of
the vigor and dignity of office that have only just now been consumed
in the flames of party passion. Our experience with elected judges-
with the state courts and with the whole army of lesser judicial stalwarts
and mercenaries - has certainly not been such as to add to the stature
of the judicial office they hold. For that reason the cult of judges and
the belief in their neutrality is all the greater paradox.
It is partly explained by our association of judges with the "rule of
law." But even more it springs from a deep need in us for some final
authority. We are, in a sense, a barbaric people, only several generations
removed from the wilderness psychology. The whole development of
American life has been riddled with violence, from the first extermina-
tion of the Indians, through the ruthless rifling of a continent, to the
use of spies and thugs against labor unions and the mowing down of
gangster "mobs" under the fire of sub-machine guns. We live in a
jungle of fear of such violence, and our exaggerated lip-service to "law
and order"" and our cult of judges are functions of that fear. Most
58. "I love judges, and I love courts. They are my ideals, that typify on earth
what we shall meet hereafter in heaven under a just God." Speech at Pocatello, Idaho.
"Al" Smith, who in the days before the New Deal mirrored the mind of the common
man as well as anyone in political life, could rage at a Tammany boss or a Val Street
banker--but he had nothing short of awe for Judge Cardozo. It Vas partly, of course,
the reverence that Cardozo inspired in everyone because of his personal qualities, but
partly also the spell of the ermine.
59. For the "law and order" myth in America, see AraoLo, S nox.s oF GovE=R-
rxNT (1935) c. 7.
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of us feel economically helpless in the midst of a ruthless exploitative
capitalism; we feel alone in a vast impersonal urban civilization. We
turn to "the law" as our final protection, and we read into the judges
our hopes for some one who will be above the battle.
Most of us associate judges with the settlement of ordinary litigation,
where political bias seems to us irrelevant; or with criminal trials, where
the judge seems to sit as an avenging and impersonal deity, expressing
through his function the sense and conscience of the community. What
easier than to transfer this conception to the Supreme Court? Espe-
cially since there are four elements that seem to magnify the objectivity
of the Supreme Court judges as compared with those of lower courts.
One is that they are in a "supreme" court, and presumably of some
higher stature than ordinary mortals. The second is that they are ap-
pointed and not elected, and escape thus the gruelling experience of a
political campaign. The third is the greatness of the judicial tradition
of the Supreme Court: some of our judges have actually been men of
enormous ability; the fact that their ability has not been conspicuously
in the direction of detachment is not generally known; what comes down
to us is the almost Periclean devotion to their public trust shown by
men like Marshall, Taney and Holmes.6" The fourth factor, and per-
haps the most important, is that we transfer our sense of the definitive
and timeless character of the Constitution to the judges who expound
it. From our image of the Constitution as the ultimate wisdom in gov-
ernment, it follows that the men versed in its lore must reach their
conclusions not by the paths of ordinary men, but by some mysterious
and inspired processes. The judges become, thus, not ordinary men,
subject to ordinary passions, but "discoverers" of final truth, priests in
the service of a godhead.
IV. NEW SYMBOLS FOR OLD
The men who fashion America's symbols have, on the whole, wrought
well the Supreme Court symbol. They have used every material at the
command of minorities of privilege when such minorities seek to pro-
tect their threatened dominance. They have controlled the newspapers,
dictated the editorials, contrived the slogans, selected the text books,
approved the lectures, filled the pulpits, guarded the microphones, spoken
with learning and authority through their proper oracles, the lawyers.
60. For a good analysis of this devotion, see FRANKFURTER, THE CO2'MERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAnE (1937), which, although a small book, is crowded
with insights into the psychological and historical character of the judicial process on
the Supreme Court. There seems to be something about the judicial robes that not
only hypnotizes the beholder but transforms the wearer; Marshall and Taney are the
principal, but not the only, instances of men whose capacities for greatness no one sus-
pected until they faced the crucial tasks of the Court.
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They have, perhaps, benefited most from the ministrations of the law-
yers. For the lawyer, by the air of mystery in which he wraps himself,
and by the impenetrable jargon he uses, is adept at the creation of
symbols. The lawyer, moreover, as the expert technician in the refine-
ments of corporate strategy, becomes the lieutenant of Big Enterprise,
its closest adjunct in the whole range of professional groups. Most
important of all, the lawyer-even more than the preacher and the
professor-being specialized in persuasion and hypnosis, manages fin-
ally to persuade himself and induce a sort of self-hypnosis that makes
him forever after a servitor of the propertied groups. And he is aided
in this functioning by his special type of mentality which, as Jerome
Frank has pointed out," has its essence in the clinging to the symbols
of authority.
The symbol-makers have, I repeat, wrought well. But recently two
sets of forces have been at work undermining the fabric they have been
at pains to build. One set has operated through our economic institu-
tions themselves and through the cross-purposes inherent in them. The
other has operated through the nature of the judicial process itself.
One consequence of industrialism is that it creates a climate in which
a symbol has to be hardy to survive. There is an erosive power in the
machine-process which makes men think increasingly in matter-of-fact
terms and before which legends tend to crumble away. Thorstein Veblen
has pointed out that the technicians and operatives of machines, who
spend their days in making, weighing, counting, measuring tangible
things, are apt finally to be skeptical of intangible- or what he called
"honorific" - values.62 But even more important is the instability of
capitalism as a system of economic order. The successive crises of
American capitalism have left their mark on the judicial power. And
the history of the Supreme Court is a sequence of crises of the judicial
power which have been related to the crises of the economic system. It
is no accident that the gravest constitutional crisis should have coincided
with the gravest economic crisis in our history, and that the key-figure
in both should be the same President. And each crisis of the judicial
power, each conflict with the democratic elements, weakens the judicial
power and leaves its deposit for the nezxt crisis to build upon.
This brings us to the second set of forces - those operating through
the judicial power itself. Historians of the future will probably count it
not the least important result of the Great Depression that it made
61. F1AbkN, loc. cit. supra note 48. A good analysis will also be found in RoBINsoZ ,
LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935). Every lawyer should read Berle, Thc Modern Legal
Profession (1933) 9 ENcyc. Soc. ScmEcEs 340; it treats, without undue tenderness,
"the complete commercialization of the American bar."
62. Notably in THE INsTiNcr OF VORKMANSHIP (1914) and THE Tumny or Busr-
,ss ExTERPRaSE (1904).
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Americans judge-conscious to a degree they had never been before. The
setting of this new consciousness is to be sought in the sharp contra-
diction between economic collapse and the "trained incapacity" to deal
with it of a political system hampered by judicial review. The judges
were faced by a fateful choice between the freezing of the vested inter-
ests and the survival of the capitalist system - and when they chose the
latter and turned "liberal," they revealed all too glaringly a very human
changeableness. Moreover, although they had to think in legalistic terms,
they had also to respond to social pressures, to the political threat of
President Roosevelt's court re-organization proposal, to such faiis ac-
complis of the economic process as the success of the steel and automobile
organization drives, which left little choice in the Wagner Act decisions.
And for judges who were accustomed to talk in absolutes, to act like
any deliberative assembly through pressures and majorities, was to for-
feit their godhead.
These were the forces at work; the precipitation of these forces was
accomplished by the Great Debate of 1937, which turned the eyes of
the nation upon the judicial power. Men began to translate what they
learned from watching the decisions into terms that had meaning in the
debate over the reform of the judicial power. The most lasting result
of the conflict between the New Deal and the Supreme Court was edu-
cational. There was a vast area in which Americans had been politically
untaught- the area of the jidicial power.6 3 A set of forces converg-
ing on the New Deal decisions accustomed them to regard the judges
as interested in social policy and capable of changing their minds. The
Supreme Court became its own bitterest enemy, and Mr. Justice Roberts
an excellent schoolmaster whether he turned his face stonily toward the
past, as in his decision in United States v. Butler,6 4 or reluctantly toward
the future, as in the Jones and Laughlin case.6" Either way, Americans
learned how the judicial power works.
They were no longer in complete innocence about the functioning of
the judicial process. They began to see that judicial decisions are not
babies brought by constitutional storks, but are born out of the travail
of economic circumstance. They learned that judges are human,"0 and
63. Just as there was a vast area-that of federal regulation-in which they had
been economically untaught. It was Mr. Roosevelt's historic function to serve, more
or less consciously, as the instrument for both these tasks of national education. Just as
under him Americans went a long way to unlearn their myth of individualist capital-
ism, and to accustom themselves both to federal regulatory action and trade union bar-
gaining, so under him they took the biggest step they had ever taken in unlearning their
allegiance to the judicial power.
64. 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
65. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 57 Sup. Ct.
615 (1937).
66. I have incorporated in this passage the argument and some of the phrasing of
my editorial, Judges are Human (1937) 144 NATION 451.
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that the judicial power need be no more sacred in our scheme than any
other power. They learned, in their bwn way, that in America the real
political sovereignty resides in the odd man on the courtY7 But they
learned also that the odd man cannot remain an isolated globule of
individual desires and convictions, but must respond finally in moments
of intense economic and constitutional crisis to the desires and convic-
tions of the people and the facts of the national life. Whatever happens,
it is not likely that they will easily forget that experience. If only for
a moment, they peered beyond the symbol of the divine right of judges
to the realities of the judicial power. They dared look upon the judicial
Medusa-head, and lo! they were not turned to stone.
Education such as this comes hard and is hard paid for. It comes
with crises, economic and constitutional. Men are not moved to ques-
tion their most deeply rooted and most skilfully publicized symbols
except under enormous pressure and great need. Only then does the
erosive power of their reason begin to function, and their myth-making
processes turn to the future instead of the past. In the great need of
economic crisis, the measures which were taken to relieve and temper
that crisis met and were blocked by the judicial power. It was then that
the symbol of divine right began to crumble.
"Thou wast not born for death, immortal Bird!
No hungry generations tread thee down."
Thus wrote John Keats, addressing himself to the deathless symbol of
the nightingale. But the Supreme Court is no deathless and unwavering
symbol. If its evocative power is on the decline, as I believe it is, it is
because it has done what no institution can do and remain unimpaired
-stood between the hungry generations and the appeasement of their
hunger, between Bill Jones and a minimal standard of decency in living.
I have spoken of hunger. There is fear also to considerGc And
because of that, the fate of the judicial symbol, for all the erosive pro-
67. The theory of judicial decision as resting on the "odd man" owes more, I think,
to Thomas Reed Powell than to anyone else in American legal thought. See, e.g., his
remarkable articles, Commerce, Pensions and Codes (1935) 49 HAnv. L Rsy. 1, 193.
The theory holds validly enough for a period of extreme constitutional tension such
as that of 1935-37; it is less valid over longer periods; and it is ahvays subject to the
criticism that it splits up reality unduly into atoms. I have attempted a criticism of
this and other atomistic explanations of the judicial process in The Su[rome Court and
American Capitalism (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 66S, especially at 696-701.
68. The classic philosopher to make fear the psychological basis of State pawer
was Thomas Hobbes. The best modern statement I know is ,VOOLY, FE=n AND Po0 -
Tics (1925), probably the only instance in the literature in which a debate on political
theory has its setting in a zoo. There is also a discussion in WVM.LAs, Tri GazT So-
cx -y (1914) c. 6. I agree with Laski, however, that the motive to obedience in the
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cesses I have described, is far from clear. The ultimate power of the
Supreme Court and the Constitution does not come wholly from the
driving force of the vested interests, with all their external control over
the moulding of opinion. It comes from what is, in the last analysis,
the strongest support any institution or tradition can have- namely,
fear. I do not mean fear of the Court, fear of the judicial power, the
fear one has of the whip-lash of tyrants. I mean the fear of not having
Court and Constitution to fall back upon. I mean the terrible fear of
change and the unknown, which is to so many people more powerful
even than the felt needs and pressures of the day. For it is fear and
not will that underlies a good part of our politics- the creeping fear
of people who do not want to make decisions, and prefer to surrender
their decisions to others.
This sort of womb-retreat is no unknown thing to social psychology.
It is a phenomenon common in every period of reaction, and familiar
enough in fascism.69 It riddles the middle-class mind especially- the
minds of those who have lost their secure economic roots in capitalism
and have not yet found roots in the emerging collectivisms. 70 We in
America are just beginning now really to explore and understand the
length and breadth and depth of the middle-class mentality in our politics
- fear-ridden, standardized, negativist in its outlook, tenacious of sym-
bols. For that mentality the Court's ancient sureness seems something
not to be abandoned, lest we confront an uncharted future.
The propertied groups are not immune to fear either. Their attitude
toward constitutional law has in the past been on the whole coldly instru-
mental. "Every dominant class, as it has arisen," says Brooks Adams,
"has done its best to use the machinery of justice for its own benefit."
' 71
State is by no means solely fear. "It may be doubted whether, save in times of passionate
crisis, the vast majority of people ever think of fear in the contest of obedience to the
law." LASKI, THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1935) 17. I have in mind not the
(conscious) fear of State power, but the (largely unconscious) fear of the absence
of State power.
69. See, e.g., SCHUMAN, THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP (1935); LASSWELL, WORLD POL-
ITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935).
70. I owe much in my conception of the place of the middle class today to COREY,
THE CRIsIs OF THE MIDDLE CLASS (1935). I have not taken account of Corey's valid
distinction between the functional and non-functional middle-class groups; that dis-
tinction seems to me to have relevance on the objective plane, but not-for the present
at least-on the psychological.
71. ADAMS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REvOLUTIONS (1913), quoted in 3 PARINGTON,
op. ci. supra note 25, at 232. It is interesting that Mr. Justice Holmes, who came from
much the same aristocratic social environment as Brooks Adams, should have arrived at
results not very different from his, although by a different route. "This tacit assump-
tion of the solidarity of the interests of society is very common, but seems to us
false. . . . But in the last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his
neighbors. . . . The more powerful interests must be more or less reflected in legisla-
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The capitalists, as a dominant but minority group operating under demo-
cratic procedures, have used the Supreme Court so long and so blindly for
their own purposes that they have finally succeeded in undermining its
strength and prestige. The spectacle of a presumably national symbol
being twisted and turned to class interest has finally broken through even
the barrage of rationalization. The capitalists find themselves thus faced
with the prospect of losing their principal protection against the tyranny
of the majority. And this they can ill afford to do. It is, says Nietzsche
in one of his scorching passages,72 a sign of the weakening of our ruling
aristocracies that they hide behind constitutions, higher laws, humani-
tarian and judicial symbols; and much the same thought will be found
in Pareto and his picture of the 6lites which do not have the stamina
to defend themselves by force and so give way to new 6lites.73 The
American capitalist 6lite is caught in a cruel dilemma. As a non-military
ruling class it must depend for its protection upon the courts and the
fabric of legality which it can control; as a group specialized to pecuniary
values and bent upon maximizing profits and minimizing costs, it must
twist the courts to its own purposes, defy laws openly when they are
aimed at wresting a share of the national income from them, and thus
break the very fabric of legality upon which they depend. 71 Small
tion; which, like every other device of man or beast, must tend in the long run to aid
the survival of the fittest. The objection to class legislation is not that it favors a
class, but either that it fails to benefit the legislators, or that it is dangerous to them
because a competing class has gained in power, or that it transcends the limits of self-
preference which are imposed by sympathy." The Gas Stokers' Strike (1873) 7 AM. L.
REv. 582, 583; reprinted in SHRIVER, JUSTICE OLIVER VEIDELUL HoLES: HIs BOor
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETFRS AND PAPERs (1936) 104, 107-03. Holmes' view at
that time was thus a curious approach to the Marxian concept, but arrived at through
social Darwinism. Where Adams was far more realistic, vras in seeing that the dom-
inant class ruled not by capturing the legislatihve machinery, as Holmes thought, but
the entire nachinery of justicc-that is, the judicial system. Actually the legislative
machinery, in a democracy like America, is more apt to be captured not by the dominant
economic minority but by the non-propertied majority. But Holmes wrote the above in
1873, before judicial review as we know it had begun to be fully developed. Adams
wrote forty years later, when it had reached its climax. What is most badly needed
today in American jurisprudence is a revaluation of the approach to law and legal
history through economic interests. Dean Pound's chapter on "The Economic Interpre-
tation" in his INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 92, does scant justice to
Pound's usual insights.
72. Nietzsche speaks in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (4th ed. Zimmern trans. 1923) 169-
110, of "the moral hypocrisy of the commanding class" which "knows no other way of
protecting themselves from their bad conscience than by playing the role of executors
of older and higher orders, of predecessors, of the constitution, of justice, of the law,
of God himself."
73. PAPnro, op. cit. supra note 4. See my Pareto's Republic (1935) 83 Nnw, RE_-
PUBLIc 135.
74. I have taken the kernel of the argument contained in this sentence from ADAus,
THE THEORY OF SoCIAL REvOLUTIONS (1913) and VEBLEi, THE VESTED INTMESTS AIM)
THE CoMMoN MAN (1920).
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wonder, then, that they are of a divided mind today; that the crumbling
of the judicial symbol fills them with fear; that they do not contemplate
with equanimity the prospects either of the gradual surrender of their
economic power or of the adventure of fascism.75
Their fears, and the fears of the lower-middle-class, have as usual
been communicated to the intellectuals - even to those liberated "liber-
als" who pride themselves on seeing through symbols. They, too, fear
the breaking of the fabric of legality - a break which might result either
in a revolutionary thrust from below or a fascism imposed from above.
We live, they feel, in a complicated and fragile civilization, where it is
conceivable that a violent wrench might send the whole structure top-
pling. What separates us from anarchy is principally the accumulated
crust of convention, otherwise known as "law." Like the Britisher in
the jungle who clings desperately to the amenities of London life, they
are jealous of any infraction of law, especially of property law and con-
stitutional law, which form the fabric of the capitalist order. If they
yield an inch, they surrender all. They too are caught in a cruel dilemma.
For intellectual groups have learned that revolutions and coups take
place when a deadlock in the capitalist system makes democracy incapable
of dealing with the continuing crises of the capitalist system; that
democracies remain paralyzed so long as they will the ends but do not
will the means; and that the further Constitution and Court move from
the realities of the common welfare, the more barren they become as
symbols and fetishes - fetishes that could easily become in the end the
rallying-points of movements to suppress liberal democracy, impose fas-
cism, and stamp out the intellectual groups. Thus they too are divided:
at once fearful of the crumbling of the American pattern of divine
right, and yet disturbed at the way it functions.
With the lower-income groups the case is somewhat different. Their
role - the role of the common man in every culture - has always been
at once symbol-breaking and symbol-making. For the common man in
the past the Constitution has been a symbol of hope and authority, and
the judicial symbol one of protection. He has become the carrier of those
symbols; to appease him and lash down his allegiance to the existing
order have been their functions. With insecurity and hunger, he has
turned increasingly to the symbols of his more direct representatives -
to legislative remedies, to executive action - above all, to trade union
organization. From the California lettuce-picker to the Pennsylvania
steel-worker, from the Minnesota truck-driver to the Arkansas tenant-
farmer, he has begun to scrutinize afresh the myths that stand between
75. Brooks Adams' comment in 1895 seems relevant today: "The only question
which preoccupies the ruling class is whether it is cheaper to coerce or bribe." ADAMS,
THE LAw OF CIVILIZATION AND DFCAY (1st ed. 1895) 292.
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him and the satisfaction of his needs. Like the middle-class clerk, store-
keeper, white-collar worker, farmer, intellectual, he is insecure and fear-
ful, and insecurity is a breeding-ground for myths and symbols. But
he differs from them in one important respect: the path lie is treading
in his quest for security in the economic system is the path that leads
necessarily through new forms of social construction and therefore
through the creation of new myths.
Thus the common man is again assuming his historic function of
symbol-breaker and symbol-maker. Trade-union action, mass political
action based upon common mass interests - these represent new collec-
tivities. They are capable of building new myths and are on the way
to doing so. But like the Constitutional myth in our early years, they
promise to be myths emotionally rooted not in fear but in hope, not in
negativism but in affirmation, not in clinging to the old but in a collective
will to build the new; and economically rooted not in the class power of
a minority group but in an expanding economy for the majority groups.
If these groups succeed in their efforts to make out of the Constitution
once more, in Corwin's phrase, an "instrument" for the common interest,
the Constitutional symbol will get renewed strength; but the path toward
such a reshaping of the Constitutional symbol lies necessarily through
the decline and fall of the symbol of the divine right of judges.
These are the forces at work. What pattern they will fall into one
cannot prophesy. One can, however, see in what is going on now in the
American mind the ultimate struggle that is at the core of every human
society - the thrust of hunger against the thrust of fear: fear, clinging
to the old symbols, and looking toward the past; hunger, looking toward
new economic constructions, reshaping old symbols, shaping new.
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